Central in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) stands the so called 'ontological difference'.1 Throughout his entire oeuvre he wants to discern between being and beings (or things), or in the original German between 'Sein' and 'Seienden'.2, 3 Western philosophy, from Plato to Nietzsche, has forgotten about this difference, treating being as if it were a first and highest being (or thing), but not being itself.4 Another feature of such metaphysical thinking is that being as a highest being (or thing) is detached from the real beings (or things), transcending them, instead of being their ground. The name that Heidegger gives to such a transcendent, highest being is 'beingness', or in German 'Seiendheit'.5 Being however, Heidegger maintains, is not a being (or thing), but rather the ground of all beings (or things) enabling their perception.6 Being regards phenomenality itself.7 And as such phenomenality may occur in an authentic way, when being itself is revealed in the phenomenon, or, as usually, in an inauthentic way, when being is covered by the appearances of beings (or things).8
Now phenomenality contains both the perceived object and the perceiving subject, presupposes both a world and an interpreter thereof, or in Heidegger's terminology: the Dasein (the subject) is equal original ('gleichursprünglich' in German) with the being of the worldly things (the objective world).9 And this seems to correspond with the manner in which Sri Nisargadatta Maharaja (born as Maruti Shivrampant Kambli, 1897-1981) describes consciousness as containing both the notions of 'I am' and the world.10 It is what he in Hindu terminology calls 'atman'. And like with Heidegger being is the ground of beings, so with Nisargadatta atman is the ground of what he calls 'jivatma', being the notion of a separate personality. Consciousness regards phenomenality, jivatma regards the inauthentic Dasein and atman regards the authentic Dasein, whereby with both thinkers the world and the beings (or things, or objects) appear equal original with the aforementioned.11, 12
The terminology of both thinkers, or rather of their English translators, may differ. Heidegger's English translated terminology is rather steadfast. Beings regard things, being regards the ground for their appearance, phenomenality, and beingness regards a, so presumed, from beings (and from the true being itself) detached highest thing. Heidegger considers this thought of beingness as a transcendent given as inauthentic (calling it fairly but in his case also pejoratively 'metaphysical' and 'onto-theological').13
Nisargadatta's English translated terminology is less steadfast. Often 'beingness' is used to refer to consciousness (to the phenomenality of Heidegger), but a term like 'pure beingness' is also found to refer to the ultimate state transcending that consciousness. And for this state also the term 'pure being' occurs, while the same term too occurs to refer again to consciousness.14, 15 Throughout the books a trend can be discovered, but applications may vary here and there, and in the English translated teachings of Nisargadatta it is important to read the terms carefully contextually.
Sometimes direct translations of Hindu terms can be recognized. Terms like "being-consciousness-bliss", "truth-wisdom-bliss" and "existence-knowledge-bliss" for instance can, although being different among each other, be taken as certain translations of the Hindu term "sat-chit-ananda".16, 17 These Hindu terms are much more steady and are therefore better suited as terminology. Hereby 'jivatma' can be taken to correspond to Heidegger's concept of the inauthentic 'Dasein', 'atman', 'sat-chit-ananda' and 'chaitanya' to his concept of the authentic 'Dasein', 'maya' to his concept of the inauthentic world, 'brahman' to his concept of the authentic world and 'parabrahman' to his concept of 'Seiendheit' (even though Heidegger denies and Nisargadatta acknowledges the validity of such a notion of transcendence).18, 19
Interesting to note is that in Nisargadatta's teachings the term 'personality' is related to the Hindu term 'jivatma'. For 'personality' is a term that is also abundantly found in the esoteric teachings of Alice Ann Bailey (1880-1949). And where Nisargadatta applies the threefold of 'jivatma', 'atman' and 'parabrahman' there Bailey thematizes the threefold of 'personality', 'soul' and 'monad'.20 Linking this esoteric threefold further to Heidegger's philosophy we get the correspondences of the personality with the inauthentic Dasein, the soul with the authentic Dasein (and equal originally with the authentic world) and the monad with the beingness. This correspondence is supported by the esoteric notion that the soul regards the principle of consciousness, for consciousness is also in Nisargadatta's overview the second principle, and atma is also in Bailey's teachings a constituent of the second principle.21 The other two constituents of the soul regard there buddhi and manas, and this threefold atma-manas-buddhi then may be related to Nisargadatta's threefold of sat-chit-ananda.
Now the important thing that can be derived from the above, especially for students of the Bailey teachings, is that the soul regards basically phenomenality. For thinking of the soul in a phenomenological manner may smash the unauthentic way of viewing it as, for instance, some kind of radiant thing inside the breast.22
It is further also interesting to have a look at the teachings of Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831-1891). For to the vocabulary of 'beings', 'being' and 'beingness' she also adds the term 'be-ness'. This term refers (or infers)23 to the transcendent state, a state for which she also uses the Hindu term 'sat'.24 This seems different from the use of 'sat' in Nisargadatta's teachings as being part of 'sat-chit-ananda', however it must not be forgotten that 'atma', which was above related to 'sat', is also in the esoteric teachings used to refer to both the spirit and the highest soul principle.25 The referents of terms, such as 'sat' and 'atma', may vary somewhat, depending upon the teacher, the school of thought and the context.26 But in line with Blavatsky's teachings on atma, buddhi and manas it is perhaps proper to consider sat as part of the soul, consciousness, being(ness), phenomenality, when it uses chit-ananda as its vehicles, while it regards the monad, be-ness, absoluteness, pure beingness, when it has detached itself from its vehicles of manifestation.27
Now one term belonging to the list of 'beings', 'being', 'beingness' and 'be-ness' has not yet been discussed, and this is the term 'non-being'. Blavatsky equals non-being with be-ness (from the perspective of the beings).28 Bailey seems to agree, equaling non-being with the withdrawal of will (or atma).29 And Nisargadatta's teachings, sometimes using the term 'non-beingness' too, seem to adhere to that view also. However more often this ultimate state is depicted by Nisargadatta as being beyond being and non-being, relegating the latter duality to the realm of consciousness.30, 31
Basically this depiction of non-being in its two modes corresponds to the two modes of sat or atma that have been mentioned above. In the one case the ultimate state, non-being, be-ness, sat, atma, is detached from manifestation, and in the other case it causes that manifestation by taking on vehicles.32 Atma first takes on the vehicle of buddhi, according to Blavatsky and Bailey,33 and non-being first takes on the vehicle of the I-am-ness, according Nisargadatta,34 but what these teachers indicate is the same, or at least very similar. And the idea has also been mentioned in an earlier contemplation.35
So what about Heidegger's vision on non-being? Heidegger too thematizes non-being, be it under the term of 'the nothing', or in German 'das Nichts'.36 Heidegger wants to think this nothing in a phenomenological manner. The nothing is not the plain negation of beings but is rather the root of being itself.37 For it is only against the background of the nothing that one can be aware of being. Being is basically conceived as not-nothing, because of which the nothing can be seen as more original than being.38
Interestingly this very much corresponds to Nisargadatta's teachings, for he teaches to leave the multitudes of beings behind and to reside with the single beingness or the I-am-ness, after which the state of non-beingness may dawn upon the practitioner.39
Now Heidegger is much more descriptive than normative, and also he wants to have nothing to do with metaphysical thought patterns. However within his phenomenological dome we may now see a metaphysical light (or rather a metaphenomenal darkness) falling in through the gap of the nothingness. So if ever a Heideggerian wants to escape his phenomenology then that might be possible through this notion of nothingness.
Heidegger | Nisargadatta | Bailey | Blavatsky |
The nothing | Non-being, parabrahman | Non-being, atma as monad, spirit | Non-being, be-ness, sat, atma(n) |
Authentic Dasein, being, phenomenality | I-am-ness, beingness, consciousness, atman, sat-chit-ananda, brahman | Atma-buddhi-manas as soul, consciousness | Atma-buddhi-manas |
Inauthentic Dasein, beings, (also: beingness as a highest, transcendent being) | Jivatma, personality, objects, maya | Personality, matter |
Figure 1: A tabulated comparison of Heidegger, Nisargadatta, Bailey and Blavatsky.